Pojęcia nicości i stosunki między nimi. Wgląd w pojęcie negacji poprzez pojęcie nicości

K. Wyszkowski, Pojęcia nicości i stosunki między nimi. Wgląd w pojęcie negacji poprzez pojęcie nicości, w: D. Chibner, M. Pietrzak, J. Wolak, K. Wyszkowski (red.), Nicość, Warszawa 2020

Abstract

Concepts of Nothingness and Relations between Them: An Insight into the Concept of Negation through the Concept of Nothingness

I distinguish two kinds of notions: concepts (pojęcia) and ideas (koncepcje). Concepts are more general and objective; ideas, more particular and subjective (nevertheless still intersubjective). The ideal, pure type of concept is a truth about the universe (cf. Hegel’s Begriff), and the pure type of idea is a specific, or even idiosyncratic, position of thought, grasping a small aspect of the truth. Ideas are like spectacles, to be looked into so as to see concepts through them. I propose (analogously to Kaufmann’s proposal for English) to translate the term Aufheben as sublimation (sublimacja). The fact that Polish lacks the word sublation, which English has, is a specific argument for the proposal. The main part of the text presents four concepts of nothingness, nothing (nic), which are logically ordered and most substantially represented in the proper concept of nothingness (nicość). The first is the concept of minuteness, the relative concept of nothingness as manifold: ontological (insignificance, znikomość) and ethical (baseness, nikczemność). Minuteness is divided into quantitative and qualitative and, independently, into subjective and objective. As its historical background, Kant’s idea of nothingness (Nichts) is interpreted. The second concept is (de)privation (lack, brak; emptiness, pustka), the absolute (and therefore onefold, sole) lack of anything positive; it is compared with Kant’s idea of purification (Läuterung), the ideal of pure reason. The third is nonentity (niebyt), abstract and manifold, yet intrinsically essential for any entity as an ontological negative aspect of its existence; with it, Hegel’s idea of nothingness (Nichts) is featured. The fourth concept is proper nothingness, the total negation of the System (resembling to some extent Kant’s transcendental negation) and hence the onefold, single, concrete, and absolute concept of nothing. Thesis: this negation is a necessary condition of the possibility of changing the System’s identity by itself. In a corollary, I discuss Meillassoux’s idea of Chaos, compare it with Böhme’s Ungrund, and equalize the former with the minuteness (in the sense referred to above) of the System.

Łącza do całego tekstu

https://www.academia.edu/44644609/Poj%C4%99cia_nico%C5%9Bci_i_stosunki_mi%C4%99dzy_nimi_Wgl%C4%85d_w_poj%C4%99cie_negacji_poprzez_poj%C4%99cie_nico%C5%9Bci

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346654059_Pojecia_nicosci_i_stosunki_miedzy_nimi_Wglad_w_pojecie_negacji_poprzez_pojecie_nicosci_Concepts_of_Nothingness_and_Relations_between_Them_An_Insight_into_the_Concept_of_Negation_through_the_Concept_of

Łącze do całej książki

(do pobrania w formie elektronicznej, za darmo)

https://kronos.org.pl/ksiazki/nicosc/