O pewnym kłopotliwym fragmencie z "Myślini" Trentowskiego. Jak wykładać filozofię polską i trochę o logice języka naturalnego

K. Wyszkowski, O pewnym kłopotliwym fragmencie z "Myślini" Trentowskiego. Jak wykładać filozofię polską i trochę o logice języka naturalnego, Kronos 67(4): 2023

Czy logika formalna tworzona za pomocą języków sztucznych nadal jest logiką formalną, czy raczej jest już czymś nowym, "logiką sformalizowaną"? Czy używanie logiki sformalizowanej jest poprawne w rozważaniach filozoficznych (powstających, naturalnie, w językach naturalnych)? Jeśli nie, to czy istnieje coś takiego, jak logika języka naturalnego, a w szczególności logika formalna języka naturalnego? Propozycje odpowiedzi na te pytania przedstawiam wychodząc od interpretacji pewnego fragmentu "Myślini" Trentowskiego, w którym znajdujemy trudną do obrony regułę myślenia.

Abstract

On a troubling fragment of Trentowski’s Logic (Myślini). How to interpret Polish philosophy, and a bit about the logic of natural language

The text is divided into three parts. In the first one I take into consideration a logical rule stipulated in Bronisław Trentowski’s Logic (Myślini): “some A are B, hence all B are A”. This rule (as formally invalid) has been used by Henryk Struve to discredit the whole epistemological and logical undertaking of Trentowski. I propose a hypothesis that makes possible seeing it as formally valid, and therefore not discrediting. It says that in natural language, as a logical rule is stipulated, two conditions obey: firstly, words like “some” shall be understood as “not all” (if not modified by some additional words); secondly, sentences in the form of “some A are B” shall be understood as “some A are all B”. Applying this hypothesis to Trentowski’s rule bears three fruits: it allows showing that the rule is valid; we find a reason why Trentowski uses the word “also” in the logical rule “all A are B, hence also some A are B”; we find a reason why Trentowski states that the reasoning in the form “some A are B, hence some B are A” is invalid. In the second part of the text, I distinguish between formal logic and formalized logic, the latter being a part of the former, the part confining itself to the artificial languages (in the logical meaning of the word “artificial”). Trentowski’s rule is used as an example of the formal logic of natural language (including artificial languages in the linguistic sense, but not in the logical sense – e.g. Esperanto), taking the natural language both as a subject and as an instrument. I argue that there is no reason to suppose that the pure, nondiscursive thought (if it exists) is better explicated or signified by (logically) artificial languages than by (logically) natural languages, that there is a possibility that natural languages have some different logical laws than the artificial ones, and that there is no ground for the assumption that the translation from natural language to artificial, and the other way around, does not entail any changes in the logical form of the translated content. Therefore, the non-formalized formal logic of natural language has its fair place next to formalized logic. In the last part, based on the assumption that the pragmatic aspect of the natural language is irreducible and unavoidable, I argue that the non-formalized formal logic must include this aspect in its rules, so natural language has laws that are both pragmatic and necessary. Necessary in the strong meaning of the word – in contrast to Grice’s maxims.

Łącza do całego tekstu

https://www.academia.edu/119818820/O_pewnym_k%C5%82opotliwym_fragmencie_z_My%C5%9Blini_Trentowskiego_Jak_wyk%C5%82ada%C4%87_filozofi%C4%99_polsk%C4%85_i_troch%C4%99_o_logice_j%C4%99zyka_naturalnego

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/380782848_O_pewnym_klopotliwym_fragmencie_z_Myslini_Trentowskiego_Jak_wykladac_filozofie_polska_i_troche_o_logice_jezyka_naturalnego